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2 May 1986, 1300DCI TALKING POINTS
SIG (Intelligence)
2 May 1986, 2:00 p.m.

The President's Report which General Stilwell has under way, together with the experience of this committee and the IG/Counterintelligence and the IG/Countermeasures, has pointed out how we can improve the effectiveness of coordination on issues under the purview of the SIG(I).

The IG/CI is well focused and is made up of the representatives of agencies who perform counterintelligence work for our government. Inherently the IG/Countermeasures is responsible for a widely disparate array of activities.

The broad array of subjects under its purview are scattered among many elements of government, indeed every element of government is in some way involved in countermeasures.

In this broad area, the proliferation of committees and working groups has inhibited cross disciplinary cooperation and contributed to a growth of bureaucratic underbrush. Uncertainty about the respective responsibilities and authority of the DCI's Security Committee and the IG/CM has proved an obstacle to effective action and collaboration in a number of areas. The Security Committee has 10 subcommittees and half a dozen or so working groups. There is little contact or coordination among these SECOM Subcommittees across security disciplines.

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We need a strong standing Intelligence Community organization with the responsibility and authority to identify and act upon individual leaks. The relationship between organizations in the Intelligence Community or the SIG and nonintelligence organizations (such as NTISSC) is ambiguous, fragile or non-existent. As a result there is too little contact, coordination and consultation.

It has become apparent that the range of problems and activities assigned to the IG/Countermeasures has been far too broad. Too many issues that are the source of considerable controversy or conflict among the agencies are being buried or not dealt with expeditiously. These differences and issues need to be surfaced more readily and brought to the attention of senior line managers for resolution.

Finally, the SIG(I) itself has not been aggressive enough in the countermeasures area and too many problems have remained unresolved or untended at lower levels and unknown or poorly understood at senior levels.

We need stronger staff support to accomplish all this. I plan to restructure the Intelligence Community Staff elements involved in these issues to create a Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Staff that would provide support to the three IGs, house the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center, and have the analytical capability to continue to perform tasks such as the Annual Hostile Threat Assessment. This staff would have the additional responsibility of supporting the IG committees and seeing that the results of each committee's work are shared with other committees and that there is a continuing consultation and coordination among various security disciplines.

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This structure is a tentative one and may require further adjustment as it is implemented. I believe that these organizational measures can be taken through my issuance of a DCID eliminating the Security Committee and through the issuance of a SIG Directive altering the structure of the IG for Countermeasures.

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ICS 86-3335
29 April 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence)

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FROM: Executive Secretary, SIG(I)

SUBJECT: SIG(I) Meeting, 2 May 1986, 1400 Hours

1. A meeting of the SIG(I) has been called at the above time by the Chairman, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, in room [redacted]

2. The subject of the meeting is changes in SIG(I) structure. A background paper on the subject is attached.

3. Attendance will be principals plus one. Please forward the name(s) of your attendee(s) to [redacted] by 1200 hours, 1 May.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

28 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Intelligence Group (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Changes in SIG(I) Structure (S)

1. As a result of work done in the preparation of the President's Report that Dick Stilwell has underway and various studies undertaken under the auspices of the National Security Council Staff, the Intelligence Community Staff and the Oversight Committees, I have concluded that improved coordination is needed in the Intelligence Community on issues under the purview of the SIG(I). Uncertainty about the respective responsibilities and authority of the DCI's Security Committee and the IG/CM has proved an obstacle to effective action and collaboration in a number of areas. } The proliferation of committees and working groups has inhibited cross disciplinary cooperation and contributed to a growth of bureaucratic underbrush. } Finally, as we have become more aware of problems and shortcomings in the area of security countermeasures in the Intelligence Community, it is apparent that the range of problems and activities assigned to the IG/Countermeasures has been far too broad. } Finally, the SIG(I) itself has not been aggressive enough in the countermeasures area and too many problems have remained unresolved or untended at lower levels and unknown or poorly understood at senior levels. } (S)

2. To be more specific:

-- The division of labor between the DCI Security Committee and the IG/Countermeasures is ambiguous. Essentially there are two groups charged with responsibility for the same problems. There is too little action and often paralysis as a result of bureaucratic tugs of war and parochial viewpoints.

B' -- The Security Committee has 10 subcommittees and half a dozen or so working groups.

-- There is little contact or coordination among the SECOM Subcommittees, that is, across security disciplines.

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- A variety of ad hoc groups have sprung up, some from within the Intelligence Community, others at the instigation of other organizations, to try and work around these problems.
- { The relationship between organizations in the Intelligence Community or the SIG and nonintelligence organizations (such as NTISSC) is ambiguous, fragile or non-existent. As a result there is too little contact, coordination and consultation. } D
- ~~There is no~~ ^{We need a strong} standing Intelligence Community organization with the responsibility to identify and act upon individual leaks. (S) C

3. Accordingly, I believe some organizational restructuring is needed to clarify lines of responsibility and coordination, as well as to give each organization an area of responsibility that is realistic in scope.

- First, I intend to abolish the DCI Security Committee and restructure its activities under the auspices of the SIG(I).
- Second, I propose to split the IG for Countermeasures into two IGs, one that deals with physical, personnel, information and industrial security and another that deals with computer security, technical surveillance countermeasures, COMSEC, and so forth.
- Third, I propose to consolidate the various subcommittees of the present SECOM into six broader committees operating under the auspices of the appropriate IG for Countermeasures. The committees should be chaired by a senior line manager from the agency that has the largest equity involved in the subject (or the best expertise) and the membership of each committee should be comprised of, again, senior line managers from agencies that have a useful role to play. The key is to involve senior line managers who can make commitments for and deliver their agencies so that the committees can act.
- ^{We need to achieve staff support to accomplish all this. I plan to} Fourth, I would restructure the Intelligence Community Staff elements involved in these issues to create a Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Staff that would provide support to the three IGs, house the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center, and have the analytical capability to continue to perform tasks such as the Annual Hostile Threat Assessment. This staff would have the additional responsibility of supporting the IG committees and seeing that the results of each committee's work are shared with other committees and that there is a continuing consultation and coordination among various security disciplines. (S) F

4. It is also apparent to me that more aggressive SIG(I) action and involvement is needed, particularly in the countermeasures arena. Too many issues that are the source of considerable controversy or conflict among the agencies are being buried or not dealt with expeditiously.

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These differences and issues need to be surfaced more readily and brought to the attention of senior line managers for resolution.] (S)

5. ^{Ch} The structure I ~~have outlined~~ is a tentative one and may require further adjustment as it is implemented. I believe that these organizational measures can be taken through my issuance of a DCID eliminating the Security Committee and through the issuance of an SIG Directive altering the structure of the IG for Countermeasures.] (S)

6. For additional detail, I refer you to the attached notes and organizational structure. The numbers in the notes correspond to numbers on the organizational chart and provide additional explanation.

7. I am scheduling a SIG(I) meeting at 1400 on Friday, May 2nd to address these changes and seek your views. I would welcome your observations and suggestions at that time.


William J. Casey

Attachments:
As Stated

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Notes: IGs/CM

IG/CM(P) Chairman: DUSD(P)

1. The Personnel Security Committee supplants SECOM's Personnel Security Subcommittee and the Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee
2. The Physical Security Committee supplants SECOM's Facility Protection Subcommittee and the Security Advisory Group (USSR).
3. The Information Security Committee supplants SECOM's Compartmentation Subcommittee. The Director of ISOO will be a member.

IG/CM(T) Chairman: ASD/C3I

4. The Technical Security Committee supplants SECOM's Computer Security Subcommittee and will have purview over COMSEC, COMPUSEC and TEMPEST.
5. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee supplants SECOM's Subcommittee of the same name.
6. The Research and Development Committee supplants SECOM's subcommittee of the same name and the Subcommittee on the Future.

Addenda

- Each committee will organize itself as appropriate, although each should have an R&D Subcommittee.
- Wherever possible, Committee Chairmen should be selected who have parallel line or committee responsibilities outside of intelligence in order to ensure that Intelligence Community and non-IC efforts are congruent or complementary.

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Notes: Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Staff

1. The Chief of the Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Staff (CISCMS) will report to the DCI through Director, Intelligence Community Staff.
 2. The CISCMS will support the SIG Chairman, IG Chairmen and the heads of the subordinate committees. The staff specifically will:
 - ensure that information, policy issues and problems developed or identified by one Committee are shared with others as appropriate. A major responsibility of the staff is to promote and facilitate cross-disciplinary coordination, consultation and cooperation.
 - assist in preparing agendas, organizing meetings and keeping records.
 - be organized to ensure that at least one professional is assigned to each IG Committee.
 - assess the foreign intelligence threat to the United States and assist the IGs in evaluating US counterintelligence and countermeasure policies, priorities and activities.
 - assemble information concerning counterintelligence and countermeasure budget and resources.
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- perform services of common concern as may be directed by the DCI as, for example, the national registry of counterintelligence publications and processing FISA requests.
3. The UDAC will identify on an urgent basis (daily) unauthorized disclosures resulting in significant damage to intelligence sources and methods and where there is some prospect of a successful investigation. These will be reported immediately to the DCI/DDCI with proposed letters requesting a prompt investigation to the FBI and, where appropriate, the head of the agency or department cited as the source of the unauthorized disclosure. The UDAC also will maintain records of unauthorized disclosures and, in cooperation with the National Intelligence Officer for Foreign Deception and Intelligence Activities will carry out damage assessments on behalf of the Intelligence Community as directed by the DCI.

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